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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
Applicant/Petitioner, 
v. 
MOUNTAINLAND BUILDERS, INC., 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF 
UTAH, and the INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
There has not been an evidentiary hearing in this case 
before the Industrial Commission, but the facts of the case 
pertaining to the statute of limitation issue are essentially not 
in dispute and this case warrants a summary disposition without 
the necessity of oral argument. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this Appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.53(2)(1994), § 63-46b-16 
(1993) and § 78-2a-3(2)(a)(1992 & Supp.1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Does the Industrial Commission require a social 
security disability award before an application for hearing for 
workers' compensation permanent total disability can be filed? 
* Case No. 96-0283-CA 
* Priority No. 7 
B. Is the Petitioner's claim for workers' compensation 
permanent total disability barred by the six year statute of 
limitation found in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988)? 
C. Is the six year period of time allowed for filing an 
application for hearing with the Industrial Commission a statute 
of limitation or a statute of repose? 
D. Does the continuing jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Commission under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1)(1988)have any impact 
upon the statute of limitation periods set forth in § 35-1-99(3) 
in light of the restrictive language contained in § 35-1-
78 (3) (a) M b ) (1988) ? 
E. Does the general doctrine of "equitable tolling" of 
statutes of limitations apply to workers' compensation permanent 
total disability if an applicant has filed for social security 
disability? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of Review to be applied in the review of all 
issues outlined above is the Correction of Error Standard. The 
Court is to review the administrative agency's Conclusions of Law 
without deference to determine whether the agency has erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law.1 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d); Morton International v. 
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Commission, 814, P.2d 581 
(Utah 1991); Moreflow Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 
(Utah App. 1991). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(1) (1988) (subsequently amended) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1988)(subsequently amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98(2) (1994) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988) (repealed 1990) . 
Utah Administrative Rule R563-1-17 (1995) . 
The complete text to the statutory provisions and rules can 
be found in Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
On October 13, 1988, the Petitioner, J. David Vigos, fell 
and sustained injuries to his head and back while working for 
Mountainland Builders, Inc. (R.l) Compensation and medical bills 
were paid through May 8, 198 9. (R.39) No ratings were ever given 
by any of the Petitioner's treating physicians for any residual 
impairment and he was released to work without restrictions on 
May 8, 198 9, although some precautions were recommended for a 
period of time. (R.207,226) On July 11, 1995 the Petitioner filed 
an application for hearing for workers' compensation permanent 
total disability benefits. (R.13) The essential issue in this 
case is whether the six year statute of limitation for permanent 
total disability found in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988) bars 
the Petitioner's claim. 
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B. Course of Proceedings. 
After the Petitioner filed his Application for Hearing with 
the Industrial Commission, the Defendants/Respondents filed an 
Answer asserting the Petitioner's claim was barred under the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988), and moved the 
Industrial Commission for a dismissal of the Petitioner's claim 
with prejudice as a matter of law. On August 21, 1995, the 
administrative law judge advised counsel for the Petitioner that 
he had 15 days within which to respond to Respondents' Motion to 
Dismiss. The Petitioner filed his Memorandum in Opposition to 
Dismiss on September 5, 1995. An Order of Dismissal was entered 
by the administrative law judge on September 18, 1995 based upon 
the Petitioner's failure to file his claim within six years after 
his industrial accident of October 13, 1988 as required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3). (Addendum A.) The Petitioner filed his 
Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission on October 16, 
1995 to which the Defendants/Respondents responded on October 27, 
1995. 
C. Disposition in Trial Court or Agency. 
On March 28, 1996, the Industrial Commission entered its 
Order denying the Petitioner's Motion for Review based upon the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98(2), because the 
Petitioner had failed to file his Application for Hearing with 
the Industrial Commission within six years from the date of his 
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accident.2 (Addendum B.) The Industrial Commission found the 
Petitioner's arguments unpersuasive and further found the 
Appellate decisions cited to be of no precedential value because 
they were decided under former case law. As to jurisdiction, the 
Industrial Commission found the argument with respect to 
continuing jurisdiction to be inapplicable because such 
continuing jurisdiction attaches only after a timely application 
for benefits has been filed. The Industrial Commission further 
found that the time for filing the Petitioner's claim with the 
Industrial Commission was not "equitably tolled" while he pursued 
Social Security disability compensation because that principle 
has not been accepted before in Utah and, furthermore, it is 
directly contrary to the provisions of the statute. 
D. Statement of Facts. 
The Petitioner, David Vigos, was employed by Mountainland 
Builders, Inc., as a carpenter. On his third day of employment, 
the plank he was standing on broke causing him to fall to the 
floor below injuring his head and back. (R.l) The Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, Mountainland Builders' insurance 
carrier, (the Respondents) paid medical expenses through July of 
1989 and temporary total disability benefits from October 14, 
1988 to May 8, 1989. (R.39) The Petitioner was released to return 
to work on May 8, 1989 without restrictions. (R.207) The 
2
 The language in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98(2) (1994) is 
essentially the same as the language of § 35-1-99(3) (1988) 
(repealed 1990) , the provision effective at the time of the 
Petitioner's industrial accident. 
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Petitioner was seen by Dr. David G. Ericksen, a Clinical 
Psychologist, for a neuropsychological evaluation on December 14, 
15, 8c 16, 1988. (R.222-226) Dr. Ericksen reported that, "while 
his areas of impairment may, at least temporarily, limit his 
ability to function at the same level of intensity, speed, and 
acuity to which he was previously accustomed, he clearly 
continues to be a very bright, capable man, with many options for 
employment and enjoyable leisure pursuits." (R.225) Dr. Ericksen 
further recommended that the Petitioner " [n]ot place himself in a 
position to be responsible for large-scale development projects, 
for approximately 12 months following his injury... [h]e would be 
well advised to pursue a somewhat more slow pace, structured line 
of work, where he can go at his own mental and physical pace, and 
increase his load and responsibility as appropriate." (R.226) 
The Petitioner sought no further treatment from May 8, 1989 
to sometime in 1994 except, perhaps, for his assertion that he 
had been to a chiropractor on Redwood Road at some unspecified 
time. (R.114) 
On January 25, 1994, the Petitioner applied for Social 
Security disability benefits. (R.24) On October 25, 1994, the 
Petitioner called Michael Bordiga, a claims adjuster for the 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, indicating that he was 
experiencing increasing problems in his back and neck. (R.114) He 
was advised of the three year statute of limitation with respect 
to medical expenses. (R.114) On November 3, 1994, Petitioner was 
notified by letter from the claims adjuster that his request for 
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ongoing medical treatment was being denied based on the 
provisions of § 35-1-98 of the Workers' Compensation Act. (R.115) 
The Petitioner was awarded Social Security disability 
benefits on June 23, 1995 effective as of January 1, 1993. 
(R.23-25) The Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing form 
with the Industrial Commission on July 11, 1995 seeking payment 
for medical expenses, travel expenses, temporary total disability 
compensation and permanent total disability compensation. (R.13) 
The Defendants/Respondents moved for an Order dismissing the 
Petitioner's claim because it was not filed within six years 
after the date of his injury as required under the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3). (R.39) On September 18, 1995, the 
administrative law judge granted the Defendants/Respondents' 
Motion and dismissed the Petitioner's claim with prejudice. 
(Addendum A.) The Order of Dismissal was affirmed by the 
Industrial Commission on March 28, 1996. (Addendum B.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission does not require a disability 
award from the Social Security Administration (SSA) prior to 
filing an application for hearing for permanent total disability 
and does not dismiss applications because this information is not 
provided. The Petitioner provides no credible evidence that this 
is the Industrial Commission's practice. The Application for 
Hearing form states that information on a SSA disability award 
must be provided with the application i£ the applicant has a SSA 
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disability award. The workers' compensation statute and 
Industrial Commission's rules require the Industrial Commission 
to use the same SSA decision making process SSA uses to determine 
disability. The workers' compensation statute and rules do not 
require a SSA disability award prior to filing an application for 
hearing for a permanent total disability claim. 
The permanent total disability statute of limitation 
clearly and unequivocally states that an application for hearing 
must be filed within six years of the industrial accident for 
claims for permanent total disability. This statute of limitation 
is not a statute of repose in violation of the open courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution. The Petitioner's cause of 
action arose on the date of his industrial accident and he had 
six years in which to file a permanent total disability claim. 
The Petitioner provides no credible reason to toll the statute of 
limitation in this case. The continuing jurisdiction of the 
Industrial Commission does not give it the authority to change or 
ignore statutes of limitations for workers' compensation 
benefits. 
-8-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DOES NOT REQUIRE A SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY AWARD BEFORE AN APPLICATION FOR HEARING FOR 
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY CAN BE 
FILED. 
A* The Industrial Commission Does Not Dismiss a Permanent 
Total Disability Claim Because A Claimant Does Not Have 
A Social Security Disability Award. 
An injured employee does not need a disability award from 
the Social Security Administration (SSA) prior to filing a 
workers' compensation claim for permanent total disability. The 
Petitioner states that "if a claimant does not have a social 
security award, then the Industrial Commission will dismiss a 
claim without prejudice because the applicant does not meet the 
statutory elements necessary to prove an injury by accident." 
(Petitioner's Brief, p.18.) The Petitioner provides no evidence 
that this is the practice of the Industrial Commission. Instead 
the Petitioner pieces together a memo and letters from the 
Industrial Commission to create a procedure that does not exist. 
The Petitioner points to a memorandum from Administrative 
Law Judge Timothy C. Allen to Marge Mele dated January 31, 1994. 
(Petitioner's Brief, p.18.) This memorandum clarifies "what 
evidence from Social Security (SSA) is needed to establish a 
prima facie case of permanent total disability for injuries 
occurring on or after July 1, 1988." (R.80) Contrary to the 
Petitioner's assertion, this memorandum does not say that all 
applications for hearing will be returned without a SSA 
disability award. Nor does it establish that a SSA disability 
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award is a statutory element for a permanent total disability 
claim. It simply outlines the evidence an injured employee needs 
to establish a prima facie case for a permanent total disability 
claim, i.e. a Notice of Award and a Disability Determination and 
Transmittal or Decision from SSA must be provided, if available. 
Furthermore, the information on the back of the Application 
for Hearing form indicates that a SSA disability award is not an 
absolute requirement. The back of the form lists the documents 
which must accompany the form; this list includes " in permanent 
total disability claims only, copy of Social Security Award 
Certificate, Decision of Administrative Law Judge or Appeals 
Council and/or Disability Determination and Transmittal Sheet 
(form SSA 831-U5), i£ Social Security total disability has been 
awarded." (R.13)(Emphasis added.) This directly contradicts the 
Petitioner's assertion that a SSA disability award is required 
before an application for hearing is filed. SSA disability award 
information is only required if an award has been made. 
The Petitioner states on page 18 of his brief that 
" [p]ursuant to the Industrial Commission rules, an applicant must 
include a "notice of award and a disability determination and 
transmittal or decision from the Social Security Administration 
when filing a claim for permanent total disability.'" 
(Incorrectly quoting Judge Allen's January 31, 1994 memorandum.) 
(Emphasis in Petitioner's Brief.) Further, the Petitioner states 
that "[i]f this is not done then the Industrial Commission will 
return the application to the applicant [and] [e]ventually, if 
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the applicant has not submitted the required information, then 
the case will be dismissed without prejudice." The Petitioner 
cites Judge Allen's January 31, 1994 memorandum and the Bradley 
case to support these assertions. In doing so, the Petitioner 
misleads this Court by failing to provide the complete facts in 
Bradley so that this Court can evaluate its relevance to this 
case. In any event, Bradley has no precedential value. 
Judge Allen's January 31,1994 memorandum is not a rule, it 
is an inter-office memorandum. The Industrial Commission's 
practices and procedures and all the relevant facts in the 
Bradley case are addressed in the Industrial Commission's brief. 
Mr. Bradley's Application for Hearing form was not returned for 
non-compliance with Judge Allen's memorandum but for failure to 
comply with the revised Application for Hearing procedures then 
in effect, as explained in the Industrial Commission's brief. 
B. The Petitioner Had No Knowledge Of And Was Not 
Prejudiced By The Industrial Commission's Alleged 
Procedure Of Requiring A SSA Disability Award Before 
Filing An Application For Hearing. 
Even if the Industrial Commission's procedures were to 
require a SSA disability award before an application for hearing 
could be filed, it would be of no consequence to the Petitioner. 
The Petitioner provides no evidence that he was aware of this 
alleged procedure for filing a permanent total disability claim 
and did not file an application for hearing because of this 
alleged procedure. The Petitioner provides no evidence that he 
was prejudiced by this alleged procedure in any way. It is likely 
that the Petitioner was informed of the alleged procedure by his 
current attorney after the statute of limitation had already 
run.3 
POINT II. 
THE PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY IS 
BARRED BECAUSE HE DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENT OF FILING .AN APPLICATION FOR HEARING WITHIN SIX 
YEARS OF HIS ACCIDENT. 
A. Section 35-1-99(3) Sets Forth In Clear And Unequivocal 
Terms What Is Required For Permanent Total Disability 
Claims. 
Under the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3)(1988) 
the Petitioner was required to file an application for hearing 
within six years of the accident. Questions of statutory 
construction are resolved by first looking at the plain language 
of the statute. CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 
897 P. 2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995) . The assumption is made that 
statutory terms are used advisedly and thus should be read 
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable. K & T. Inc. V. Korolis. 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 
1994) . 
Section 35-1-99(3) states that " a claim for compensation 
for . . . permanent total disability benefits is wholly barred, 
unless an application for hearing is filed with the Industrial 
3
 The Affidavit of the Petitioner's attorney, Eugene C. 
Miller, states " [o] n Novembei: 3, 1994 the applicant came to my 
office because the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah denied Mr. 
Vigos' request for additional medical benefits. Prior to that 
time I had not represented Mr. Vigos in his industrial claim." 
(R.99-100) It should also be noted that Mr. Miller was the 
attorney in the Bradley case. (R.82) 
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Commission within six years after the date of the accident." 
Utah Code Ann. 35-1-99(3)(1988). The Petitioner argues that the 
term "accident" should include the date he could no longer work 
because an injured employee cannot apply for workers' 
compensation permanent total disability benefits until he has a 
SSA disability award. (Petitioner Brief, p.13-14.) This 
conclusion is based on the Petitioner's interpretation of the 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(1) (1988) which states that " [p]ermanent 
total disability . . . requires a finding by the commission of 
total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration 
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulation as revised." 
(R.13-18) 
The Petitioner's interpretation of § 35-1-67(1) is 
inaccurate. The plain language of this section states that the 
Industrial Commission will follow the sequential decision-making 
process of the Social Security Administration (SSA) to make a 
finding of total disability. There is nothing confusing or 
misleading about the language in § 35-1-67(1). There is no 
requirement that an injured employee must be found disabled by 
the SSA before filing a workers' compensation claim for permanent 
total disability.4 The Industrial Commission is merely required 
to use the SSA disability decision making process. 
4
 Not all workers' compensation permanent total disability 
claimants qualify for SSA disability benefits. For example, an 
injured employee who is 65 or over would not be able to get 
social security disability benefits, only retirement benefits. 
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This conclusion is consistent with the administrative rules 
promulgated by the Industrial Commission regarding permanent 
total disability claims. Utah Administrative Rule R568-1-17B 
states that "[i]n the event that the Social Security 
Administration or its designee has made, or is in the process of 
making, a determination of disability under the foregoing 
process, the Commission may use this information in lieu of 
instituting the process on its own behalf." This section 
recognizes that a claim for permanent total disability may be 
made without filing for SSA disability (the language "in the 
event") . It also recognizes that a SSA decision on disability is 
not required before filing (the language "or is in the process of 
making") . Finally, the Commission is not required to use the 
information from SSA but "may use this information in lieu of 
instituting the process on its own behalf." (Emphasis added.) 
In addition, Subsection D. states that "[t]o make a 
tentative finding of permanent total disability the Commission 
incorporates the rules of disability determination in 20 CFR 
404.1520 . . . the sequential decision making process referred to 
requires a series of questions and evaluations to be made in 
sequence . . . ." Utah Admin. R568-1-17D(1995). This indicates 
that the Industrial Commission is to use the same decision making 
process used by SSA. It does not state, nor does it imply that a 
SSA disability award is needed before an applicant can file for 
workers' compensation permanent total disability benefits. 
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In conclusion, both § 35-1-67(1) and R568-1-17 confirm that 
the statutory relationship between workers' compensation 
permanent total disability benefits and SSA disability benefits 
is limited to the requirement that the Industrial Commission use 
the SSA decision making process to determine disability. These 
provisions do not support the Petitioner's claim that the statute 
and the rules require a SSA disability award prior to filing an 
application for hearing for permanent total disability.5 
B. The Statute Of Limitation Began To Run October 13, 
1988, The Date Of The Petitioner's Industrial Accident. 
The Petitioner's Reasons For Tolling The Statute Of 
Limitations Are Without Merit. 
Section 35-1-99(3)states that the application for hearing 
must be filed within six years of the date of the accident. The 
term "accident" is not defined in the statute. In Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n., 729 P.2d 15, 22 (Utah 1986) "accident" was 
defined as "an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may 
either be the cause of or the result of an injury." The 
unexpected or unintended occurrence was the Petitioner's fall on 
a construction site on October 13, 1988. This fall caused the 
Petitioner's injuries. The Petitioner's cause of action for a 
permanent total disability claim accrued on October 13, 1988 as 
this is the date he was injured. 
This determination is consistent with the decisions in Avis 
v. Board of Review of the Industrial Comm'n., 837 P.2d 584 (Utah 
5
 The argument that the Industrial Commission's procedure is 
to require a SSA disability award before filing is also without 
merit. See Point I. 
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App. 1992) and Middlestadt v. Industrial Comm'n., 852 P.2d 1012 
(Utah App. 1993). In Avis, the employee's claim for permanent 
partial disability due to a back injury was denied per § 35-1-99. 
The court concluded that the employee's cause of action accrues 
when the accident occurred, stating: 
The petitioner knew of his injury on July 4, 1968 [the date 
he injured his back due to a motorcycle accident]. He 
received medical treatment for his injury and was aware of 
recurring back pain over a period of several years. 
Therefore, even though petitioner did not seek a disability 
rating or file a compensation claim until twenty-two years 
after his accident, he knew of the injury and could have 
filed for compensation within the statutory period. 
Petitioner seeks a rule which would postpone running of the 
statute until he "discovered" the full extent of his injury. 
The workers' compensation statute, however, does not require 
stabilization before filing for benefits. 
Id. at 588. See also, Middlestadt v. Ind. Comm'n., 852 P.2d 1012 
(Utah App. 1993)(adopting the Avis conclusion and rejecting the 
argument that the statute of limitation is tolled until the 
claimant discovers the full extent of his injury.) 
Likewise, in the instant case the statute of limitation 
should not be tolled until the Petitioner was no longer able to 
work. The Petitioner's injuries were apparent on the date of 
accident. He received medical treatment and temporary total 
disability payments for this injury. The Petitioner apparently 
had continuing problems during the six year limitation period. He 
filed for SSA disability benefits on January 24, 1994, well 
within the six year statutory period. SSA found he was unable to 
work after January 1, 1993. Thus, the Petitioner knew of his 
injury and disability, and could have filed an application for 
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hearing for permanent total disability within the six year 
period. 
The Petitioner argues that he was not aware of his right to 
file an application for hearing for permanent total disability 
benefits. In Avis. the court stated that "mere ignorance of the 
existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running of 
the statute of limitation." Id. at 587-88 (citation omitted). 
The Petitioner also suggests that the Respondents neglected 
to inform him of his right to file a hearing until after the 
statute of limitation barred him from doing so. (Petitioner's 
Brief, p.3 0.) A review of the record indicates that the 
Petitioner never requested payment of disability benefits. The 
last medical expense payment made by the Respondents was in July 
of 1989. (R.39) The three year statute of limitation on the 
Petitioner's medical expenses ran in July of 1992.6 The 
Respondent's claim file shows no contact with the Petitioner 
between November, 1989 and October, 1994. (R.114) On October 25, 
19 94 the following computer log was made regarding a phone 
conversation with the Petitioner on that date: 
Claimant called to state that he has been experiencing 
increasing problems in his low, mid and upper back and neck. 
He stated that it is related to his original industrial 
injury. He cannot remember when he had treatment last 
although he explained that he saw a chiropractor on Redwood 
Road who apparently didn't understand his problem and 
worsened his condition. He couldn't state when this 
occurred, but it seemed that it may have been some time ago. 
6Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(2) (1988) (repealed 1990) imposed a 
three year limitation period for medical expenses. Three year 
statute of limitation is currently found in § 35-1-98(1). 
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He is currently employed in his own business called Wild 
West Enterprises, which, according to the claimant, finds 
work for other people. His pager is #535-3015 and his home 
number is #272-7770. He states that his worsening condition 
has made it impossible at times to work. I explained that we 
would retrieve his claim from archives and evaluate. He 
wants to go to his original chiropractor, Dr. Craig Buhler. 
I also explained the three year treatment rule. 
(R.114) 
The Respondents' records show that the Petitioner first 
contacted them regarding additional medical expenses 2 years 
after the statute of limitation for medical expenses had passed. 
The Petitioner said nothing about being unable to work. In fact, 
he said he was currently employed in his own business. The 
Respondent's November 3, 1994 letter notifying the Petitioner 
that he had a right to a hearing was regarding the medical 
expenses statute of limitation because that is what was discussed 
in the October 25, 1994 conversation. There was never any 
discussion regarding the statute of limitation for disability 
claims. 
The Petitioner claims he contacted the Respondents at least 
50 times, and spoke to the claims adjuster at least a dozen times 
starting about a year after his release. (R.lll) The Petitioner 
was released for work on May 8, 1989. (R.207) Thus, the 
Petitioner maintains that since mid 1990 he tried to get the 
Respondents to pay additional medical treatment, yet the only 
record of these attempts is one computer log made on October 25, 
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1994 - two years after the statute of limitation for medical 
expenses had expired.7 
The Petitioner is a highly educated business man. He has a 
Ph.D in higher education/management science and has taught at the 
University of Utah in the Management Department and at 
Westminster College. (R.222) He has been involved in high-
intensity, high-stake business dealings in the past. (R.226) As 
recently as October 1994 he had his own business. (R.114) The 
Petitioner also retained counsel to represent him at his social 
security disability proceedings where evidence of his industrial 
injury was presented. (R.30,33) The Petitioner had ample 
opportunity to investigate his rights under workers' compensation 
laws and file an application for hearing for permanent total 
disability within the six year period. 
The Petitioner cites the treatise Workmens' Compensation 
Law, by Arther Larson to support the tolling of the statute of 
limitations. However Larson was criticizing jurisdictions with 
short periods of limitation. The scenario described in § 78.42 
(a) of 2B Larson, Workmens' Compensation Law referred to by 
Petitioner has no application in the instant case. In that case, 
the Applicant had been struck in the eye by a metal chip. The 
injury had been dismissed by the company doctors as a petty 
accident with no present injury or disability. Eighteen months 
7
 The claims adjuster recalled speaking to the Petitioner two 
to three times, although he did not recall whether it was before 
or after the October 25, 1994 conversation. (R.114) 
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later, a cataract developed and Applicant was denied a remedy 
because the statute in that jurisdiction barred claims filed more 
than one year after the accident. The harshness of a one year 
statute of limitations was obvious in that case because the 
worker could not claim compensation during the year because he 
had no compensable injury and he could not claim compensation 
after the year because the statute had run. That case is totally 
dissimilar to the instant case. The Petitioner sustained a 
compensable injury and was compensated for such. The Petitioner 
had six years from the date of his accident to claim permanent 
total disability, but failed to file an application for hearing 
even though he knew, or should have known long before the filing 
deadline expired, that he might have a claim for permanent total 
disability. 
C. The 1988 Changes In The Statute Of Limitation 
Provisions Clarified The Procedures For Filing A Claim 
For Permanent Total Disability. 
Prior to 1988, Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 
addressed the statutes of limitations for workers1 compensation 
claims. Claims for compensation were barred unless filed within 
three years after the date of accident or the date of last 
payment of compensation. Neither section provided a statute of 
limitation specifically for permanent total disability claims. In 
fact, in Mecham v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 
1984) the court determined that the applicant could file her 
petition for permanent total disability at any time so long as 
her disability arose from the original injury because she had 
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given notice during the three year limitation period found in 
section 35-1-99. 
The statute of limitation prior to 1988 was also vague as to 
what a claimant must do to toll the statute of limitation. 
Section 35-1-99(1987) stated that "if no claim for compensation 
is filed with the industrial commission within three years . . . 
the right to compensation shall be barred." Section 35-1-100 
indicated the claimant must "file with the commission in writing 
notice of such accident. . ."In Utah State Insurance Fund v. 
Dutson. 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court 
addresses the notice provisions of §§35-1-99 & 35-1-100. The 
Court acknowledged that a claim for compensation did not need to 
"bear any particular formality," finding that it "need only give 
notice to the parties and to the commission of the material facts 
on which the right asserted is to depend." Id. at 709 (citations 
omitted). However, contrary to the Petitioner's assertion, Dutson 
is not applicable to this case because it interprets statutory 
provisions not in effect at the time of the Petitioner's injury. 
In 1988, section 35-1-99 was revised to clarify the statute 
of limitation for workers' compensation benefits. Subsection 35-
1-99(3) was added which specifically addressed permanent total 
disability claims. This subsection barred permanent total 
disability claims "unless an application for a hearing is filed 
with the Industrial Commission within six years of the date of 
the accident." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988). Thus, the 
legislature, likely as a result of the above two cases, added a 
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statute of limitation for permanent total disability claims and 
unequivocally outlined what an injured employee must do to claim 
permanent total disability. The language in § 35-1-99(3) is not 
ambiguous, confusing or inoperable. The Industrial Commission 
must have notice that an injured employee wants a hearing for 
permanent total disability within six years of the employees' 
industrial accident. 
In conclusion, the Petitioner's claim for permanent total 
disability is barred because he did not file an application for 
hearing within six years of the date of his industrial accident. 
Neither the statute or administrative rules require a SSA 
disability award before a permanent total disability claim can be 
filed. The Petitioner was aware of his injury and his inability 
to work during the six year period and could have filed an 
application for hearing during the six years. 
POINT III. 
THE SIX YEAR LIMITATION FOR FILING FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS IS NOT A STATUTE OF 
REPOSE VIOLATING THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION IN THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
The six year limitation on permanent total disability claims 
applicable at the time of the Petitioner's industrial injury is a 
statute of limitation not a statute of repose. Utah Courts have 
distinguished statutes of limitations from statutes of repose. A 
statute of repose begins to run from a date or event independent 
and unrelated to the date of legal injury. Selvage v. J.J. 
Johnson & Assoc., 910 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Utah App. 1996) . A statute 
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of limitation does not begin to run until the cause of action has 
accrued. Id. 
Statutes of repose violate the open courts provision of 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.8 Statutes of 
limitation do not. Statute of limitations promote justice by 
"preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have 
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories 
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Avis v. Bd. Of 
Review of Ind. Comm'n.. 837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1992). 
Statute of limitations are presumptively constitutional. Id. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) states "[a] claim for 
compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary 
partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability 
benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is wholly 
barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the 
Industrial Commission within six years after the date of the 
accident." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988). This statute is 
not a statute of repose. It does not begin to run from a date or 
event independent and unrelated to the date of legal injury. 
Rather, it runs from the date of the legal injury - the date of 
the industrial accident. The Petitioner's cause of action for 
Art I. § 11 states "All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall 
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party." 
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workers' compensation benefits arose on the date of his 
industrial injury on October 13, 1988. There was no dispute as to 
whether the Petitioner was injured. The Petitioner's medical 
expenses were paid as were temporary total disability benefits. 
On two occasions this court has decided that workers' 
compensation statutes of limitations are not statutes of repose 
just because an injured employee did not discover the full extent 
of his injuries within the limitation period. In Avis, a claimant 
filed for permanent partial disability benefits after the statute 
of limitation period in § 35-1-99 expired, arguing that he could 
not file his claim for disability benefits until he received a 
disability rating. The court rejected the claimant's argument 
that the statute of limitation should be tolled until the 
claimant "discovered" the full extent of his injury. Id. at 588. 
The court determined that section 35-1-99 did not violate the 
open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.9 
Similarly, in Middlestadt v. Industrial Comm'n.. 852 P.2d 
1012 (Utah App. 1993) the claimant filed for additional 
disability benefits after the eight year limitation period for 
benefits found in Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 (1977). 
The court, following Avis, stated that "a workers' cause of 
action accrues when the industrial accident occurs. A statute 
9
 At the time section 35-1-99 imposed a three year statute 
of limitation on filing a claim. The court was asked to declare 
that version and the 1988 version (the version applicable to this 
case) unconstitutional. The court stated that "our ruling on the 
earlier statute's constitutionality renders this point moot." 
Avis, 837 P.2d at 586. 
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requiring filing within a set period following the accident is 
therefore a statute of limitation not a statute of repose." Id. 
at 1013 (citations omitted). The court determined that if the 
claimant knew that his condition was still unstable, he could 
have filed for an increase in his permanent partial award during 
the statutory time frame to allow for future loss of earnings. 
Id. at 1014. If the claimant did not anticipate future 
disability, then he was no better off than he would be in a civil 
suit where he would have been required, but unable to prove his 
future damages. Id.10 
In the instant case, the Petitioner is also arguing that § 
35-1-99 (3)is a statute of repose, and that the statute should not 
begin to run until the Petitioner knew the full extent of his 
injury, i.e. that he was unable to work. Section 35-1-99(3) is a 
statute of limitation because the Petitioner's cause of action 
arose on the date of his industrial accident. Like the claimants 
in Avis and Middlestadt, the Petitioner should not be allowed to 
toll the statute of limitation because he had not "discovered" 
the full extent of his injury.11 In fact, the Petitioner had 
10
 Regardless of the exclusive remedy provisions in workers1 
compensation law, the Petitioner would not have a remedy in a 
civil action because the applicable statute of limitation is four 
years per Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25 (1992 & Supp. 1996). 
11
 The "discovery" rule is used for occupational diseases 
which recognizes that the onset of the occupational disease 
likely does not occur for a period of time after exposure thus 
the statute of limitations is tolled until the cause of action 
arises - when the employee knows of his/her occupational disease. 
This is in contrast to the Petitioner who, like the claimants in 
Avis and Middlestadt knew of his injury on the date of the 
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discovered the full extent of his injury during the six year 
statute of limitation found in § 35-1-99(3). He filed for Social 
Security disability benefits on January 25, 1994, within this six 
year period. The SSA determined he was disabled as of January 1, 
1993 and awarded benefits back to that date. Clearly, the 
Petitioner was aware of his disability within the six year 
statute of limitation period. His failure to file an application 
for hearing within six years bars his claim for permanent total 
disability per Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99(3). 
POINT IV. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S CONTINUING JURISDICTION OVER 
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION CLAIMS DOES NOT GIVE IT AUTHORITY TO 
MODIFY OR IGNORE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1) states that the "powers and 
jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing." However, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(3) states 
(a)This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any 
respect the statutes of limitations contained in other 
sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Law. 
(b)The commission has no power to change the statutes of 
limitations referred to in Subsection (a) in any respect. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(3) (1988) (subsequently amended) .12 
The Petitioner argues that the Industrial Commission 
"totally disregarded" § 35-1-78(1) when it dismissed his claim. 
industrial accident. 
12
 This subsection is currently found in Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-78 (4) (1994) . 
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(Petitioner's Brief, p.27.) However, the Petitioner totally 
disregards § 35-1-78(3) which states that the Industrial 
Commission's continuing jurisdiction over claims does not modify 
statutes of limitations, and that the Industrial Commission has 
no power to change statutes of limitations. 
POINT V. 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE TOLLING IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY. 
The doctrine of equitable tolling of a statute of limitation 
is used when a plaintiff has multiple legal remedies available. 
Gudenau & Co., Inc. v. Sweeney Ins., 736 P.2d 763, 768 (Alaska 
1987). Courts do not require a plaintiff to pursue two separate 
and duplicative remedies. Id. If the plaintiff adopts a single 
course of action which is dismissed or fails, "courus generally 
allow the plaintiff to pursue a second remedy based on the same 
right or claim, tolling the limitations period during the 
pendency of the initial defective action." Id. (emphasis added). 
The Petitioner's right to social security disability 
benefits and workers' compensation disability benefits are not 
duplicative remedies based on the same right or claim. The rights 
to social security benefits and workers' compensation benefits 
are separate and distinct rights. Equitable tolling applies when 
there are different legal remedies for the same right or claim. 
Thus, the doctrine is not applicable to the Petitioner's case. 
The Petitioner argues that the doctrine of equitable tolling 
should apply because the Industrial Commission "requires an 
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applicant to first obtain a determination of disability from the 
SSA before an application for hearing can be filed for permanent 
total disability." (Petitioner's Brief, p.31) As indicated in 
Point I. this assertion is incorrect. The Industrial Commission 
does not require a SSA disability award before an application for 
hearing can be filed. Furthermore there is no evidence the 
Petitioner mistakenly believed this was the Industrial 
Commission's procedure. Thus, the Petitioner was in no way 
prejudiced and has no basis for asking this Court to equitably 
toll the statute of limitation on his workers' compensation 
permanent total disability claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah's workers' compensations laws and the Industrial 
Commission's rules do not require a social security disability 
award before a claim for permanent total disability can be filed. 
The Industrial Commission's procedures also do not impose this 
requirement. The Petitioner failed to file an application for 
hearing for permanent total disability within six years of his 
industrial accident, as required by the workers' compensation law 
in effect at the time. The Order of the Industrial Commission 
should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted this J <T day of October, 1996 
RICHARD G. SUMSION; 
-e-u-jci ty-A^t^i-
TERESA J. MARECK I 
Attorneys for the Respondents, 
Mountainland Builders, Inc. 
and Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2 S day of October, 1996 
two true and correct copies of the Brief of 
Defendants/Respondents were hand delivered or mailed by U. S. 
Mail, postage prepaid addressed as follows: 
Eugene C. Miller, Jr. 
Attorney for the Petitioner 
40 East South Temple, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Alan Hennebold 
Attorney for the Industrial Commission 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM A 
KJ ^ 
RECEIVED 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 95599 SEP 2 0 1995 
J. DAVID VIGOS, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* 
vs. * 
* 
MOUNTAINLAND BUILDERS * 
INC.,and/or WORKERS * 
COMPENSATION FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On July 11, 1995 the applicant filed a claim for temporary 
total compensation and permanent total disability benefits in the 
above-entitled matter, alleging the same are the result of the 
industrial accident of October 12, 1988. Thereafter, the defendant 
raised the statute of limitations defense of Section 35-1-99(3), 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 99 requires that a claim for weekly 
compensation benefits must be filed within six (6) years of the 
date of the accident or the claim is wholly barred. In this case, 
the file indicates that the applicant was paid temporary total 
disability by the defedants for the period October 14, 1988 to May 
8, 1989. The defendants also last paid medical expenses for the 
applicant's claim in July of 1989. 
Herein, the applicant filed his claims more than 6 years after 
the accident, namely on July 11, 1995, when the same should 
have been filed no later than October 13, 1994. 
Therefore, as a matter of law the claims for permanent total 
disability and temporary total disability benefits mustrbe denied 
as required by the foregoing statute, Section 99. 
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good cause for 
dismissing the claim, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the Applicant 
for permanent total and temporary total disability benefits be, and 
the same is hereby, dismissed with prejudice. 
Workers Compensafem Fund 
Legal Qepartnrant 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed this Order shall be final and not 
subject to further review or appeal. In the event a Motion for 
Review is timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days 
from the date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this 18th day of September,1995. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on September 18, 1995 a copy of the 
attached ORDER OF DISMISSAL was mailed to the following persons at 
the following addresses, postage paid: 
J. David Vigos, 3640 Aurora Circle, SLC, UT 84124 
Richard Sumsion, Atty, WCFU, P.O. 57929, SLC, UT 84157 
Eugene C. Miller, Jr., Atty, 40 E. So. Temple, #300, SLC, UT 
84111 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Roxanne Fowler 
ADDENDUM B 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
J. DAVID VIGOS, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN BUILDERS, INC. 
and THE WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
J. David Vigos asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to 
review the Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of Mr. Vigos' claim 
for benefits under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this 
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW 
Is Mr. Vigos' claim barred by the statute of limitations found 
in §35-1-98(2) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The facts material to the foregoing issue are not in dispute. 
Mr. Vigos alleges an industrial injury occurring on October 12, 
1988. He filed his claim for workers' compensation benefits with 
the Industrial Commission on July 11, 1995. 
* ORDER DENYING 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
* 
* Case No. 95-0597 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
PAGE 2 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Since July 1 1988, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act has 
required injured workers to file their claims for disability 
compensation with the Commission within six years from the date of 
their industrial accidents. This statute of limitations, now found 
in §35-1-98(2) of the Act, provides in material part as follows: 
A claim for compensation for temporary total 
disability benefits, temporary partial disability 
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or 
permanent total disability benefits is barred, unless an 
application for hearing is filed with the commission 
within six years after the date of the accident. 
Under the plain language of the foregoing statute, Mr. Vigos' 
claim was barred when he failed to file it with the Industrial 
Commission within six years from the date of his accident. The 
Industrial Commission is compelled to conclude, as did the ALJ, 
that Mr. Vigos claim must be dismissed. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Industrial Commission has 
considered Mr. Vigos' arguments, but finds them unpersuasive. The 
appellate decisions cited by Mr. Vigos were not decided under the 
provisions of §35-1-98(2) and are of no value as precedent in this 
case. As to the argument that the Industrial Commission has 
continuing jurisdiction over Mr. Vigos' claim, such jurisdiction 
attaches only when a timely application for benefits has been 
filed. In this case, Mr. Vigos' application was untimely. 
Finally, with respect to Mr. Vigos' contention that the time for 
filing his workers' compensation claim was "equitably tolled" while 
he pursued his right to Social Security disability compensation, 
Mr. Vigos admits that this principle has not been accepted before 
in Utah. The Industrial Commission declines to apply it now, since 
±t is directly contrary to the provisions of §35-1-98(2). 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
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QRQER 
The Industrial Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and 
denies Mr. Vigos' motion for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated thisJ^j? day of March, 1996. 
NOTICE OF APPSAfr RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this 
order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial 
Commission within 20 days of the date of , this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of 
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 3 0 
days of the date of this order. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
PAGE 4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion 
For Review in the matter of J. David Vigos, Case No. 95-0597, was 
mailed first class postage prepaid this {?{X day of March, 1995, to 
the following: 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
3 640 AURORA CIRCLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84124 
EUGENE C. MILLER JR. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
40 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
RICHARD G. SUMSION 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
Adell Butler-Mitchell 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
ORDERS\05-0597 
ADDENDUM C 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. I, § 11 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 177. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 7 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. -— 50 C.J.S. Juries § 9 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated or simi-
lar offense, right to trial by jury in criminal 
prosecution for, 16 A.L.R.3d 1373. 
Right in equity suit to jury trial of counter-
claim involving legal issue, 17 A.L.R.3d 1321. 
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or 
to jury, 19 A.L.R.3d 1393. 
Automobiles: validity and construction of 
legislation authorizing revocation or suspen-
ANALYSIS 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Actions by court. 
Actions by state. 
Actions not created. 
Arbitration Act. 
Assignments. 
Attorneys' duties. 
Criminal law. 
—Suspension of execution of death sentence. 
Debt collection. 
District court jurisdiction. 
Election contest. 
Forum non conveniens. 
Injury or damage to property. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Land Registration Act. 
Limitations. 
—Limitations of actions. 
—Statutory limitation of review. 
Occupational disease law. 
Sovereign immunity. 
Torts. 
—Action by wife against husband. 
—Loss of consortium. 
Unlicensed law practice. 
Waiver of rights. 
Workmen's compensation law. 
Cited. 
sion of operator's license for "habitual," "per-
sistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic reg-
- ulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367. 
>• Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
t Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 
A.L.R.4th 565. 
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory 
" discharge from employment, 52 A.L.R.4th 
1
 1141. 
Right to jury trial in state court divorce pro-
ceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955. 
r Jury trial rights in, and on appeal from, 
small claims court proceeding, 70 A.L.R.4th 
f 1119. 
Key Numbers. — Jury ®=» 9 et seq. 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1981 et 
seq., is vested originally in the federal courts, 
but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by 
state courts is not thereby prohibited; in view 
of the provisions of this section, therefore, it 
was error for trial court to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 
625 (Utah 1977). 
Trial court would not err in dismissing ac-
tion brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the 
ground of forum non conveniens in a proper 
case, but such dismissal should be without 
prejudice so that the plaintiff might move his 
suit to another forum without harm to his 
claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 
1977). 
Actions by court 
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open pro-
bate proceeding and to proceed against bond of 
administratrix where she has practiced extrin-
sic fraud on the court. Weyant v. Utah Sav. & 
Trust Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.L.R. 
1119 (1919). 
Actions by state. 
This section did not alter the law with re-
spect to certain rights which are vested in the 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
History: Const. 1896. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments. 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, 
the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. Perma-
nent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a finding by the 
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt 
rules that conform to the substance of the sequential decision-making process 
of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 
(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-
week entitlement, compensation shall be 662/3% of the employee's average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per 
week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor 
children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a) 
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the 
injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation 
rate under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average 
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks 
of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in 
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the 
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent 
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of 
this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier 
by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable perma-
nent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer 
or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Sec-
tion 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection 
(2), the compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be 
reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the 
Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same 
period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all 
cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings have 
occurred: 
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(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and 
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, refer the employee to the vocational rehabilitation agency under 
the State Board of Education for rehabilitation training. The commission 
shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for use in the rehabilitation 
and training of the employee. 
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of 
Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has 
fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the em-
ployee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be 
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a 
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regard-
ing rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a 
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not 
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly 
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits 
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally dis-
abled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, 
and ends with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable 
of returning to regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has 
been rehabilitated or the employees rehabilitation is possible, but where 
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for 
permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to compensa-
tion, unless the employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort 
under this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both 
arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body 
members, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated ac-
cording to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability is 
required in any such instance. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-67, enacted by L. ~ent substituted "$120" for "$110" in the first 
1988, ch. 116, § 4. sentence of the second paragraph. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 19S-S. Effective Dates. — Section 2 of Laws 1985, 
ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67. as \~sz ch. 160 provided: "This act takes effect upon 
amended by Laws 1985, ch. 160, § 1, r e l a t e approval by the governor, or the day following 
to permanent total disability, effective Julv :". ^ e constitutional time limit of Article VII, 
1988, and enacts the present section. * Sec- 8 without the governor's signature, or in 
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amend- ~ e case of a veto the date of veto override. 
Approved March 18, 1985. 
4. NOTES TO DECISIONS J & • - / 
ANALYSIS / 
Arm injuries. 
Commencement of benefits. 
Determination of character of disability. 
Estoppel. 
Eye injuries. 
Findings. 
Law in effect. 
Maximum benefits. 
Multiple injuries. 
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Qualifications of panel members. mony of the chairman of the panel, a doctor, in 
Statutory requirement that medical panel support of the report Mollerup Van Lines v 
member specialize in "treatment of the dis- Adams, 16 Utah 2d 235, 398 P 2d 882 (1965) 
ease" was met where practice consisted of In proceeding by widow of deceased oil 
representing businesses and teaching, even driller to recover compensation for his death 
though physician did not actually treat pa- from coronary occlusion on ground that death 
tients on an appointment basis Edwards was caused by inhalation of fumes while mix-
Tillery, 671 P2d 195 (Utah 1983). mg mud compound designed to flush out 
clogged pipes during oil drilling operations, the 
Referral to panel. industrial commission did not have to accept 
T);scretion ^ e m o s t probable of three theories advanced 
As the evidence of the causal connection be- a s P 0 S S l b l l l t i e s by t h e Pan*l Williams v Indus-
As the evidence oi trie causal connection be Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 169, 406 P 2d 707 
tween an employee lifting a very heavy beam noftt) 
and the perforation of his ulcer w as not uncer-
tain or highly technical, the failure to refer the Supplemental award. 
case to a medical panel was not an abuse of Supplemental award of workmen's compen-
discretion Champion Home Bldrs v Indus- sation for deterioration of condition caused by 
trial Comm'n, 703 P 2d 306 (Utah 1985) original injury was properly granted by the 
n , x x , , , . . commission where evidence of the medical 
Report, statements and admissions. j appointed by the commission, showed 
In a proceeding for supplemental award of ^
 c l a i r o a n t > s s u b s e q u e n t l n j u n e s h a d n o t a d . 
workmen s compensation for deterioration of
 y a n c e d d e t e n o r a t l o n o f c o n d l t l 0 n resulting 
condit.on caused by original mjury where the
 from M , M o „ V a n L m e g y 
commission had appointed a medical panel to
 M «. U t a h 2 / 2 3 5 3 9 g £2d 8 g 2 ( 1 9 6 5 ) 
make an independent investigation and report 
for the guidance of the commission, neither Cited m Hone v J F Shea Co, 728 P2d 
party was bound by any statement or admis- 1008 (Utah 1986), Greyhound Lines v Wal-
sion made either in the report or in the testi- lace, 728 P 2d 1021 (Utah 1986) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 100 C J S Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 590 <s=> 1694 
A.L.R. — Workmen's compensation uce of 
medical books or treatises as independent evi-
dence, 17 A L R 3d 993 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify 
award — Authority to destroy records — Interest 
on award — No authority to change statutes of 
limitation. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time 
modify or change its former findings and orders Records pertaining to cases 
that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of total 
permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 
35-1-99, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the 
rate of 8% per annum from the date when each benefit payment would have 
otherwise become due and payable. 
(3) (a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the 
statutes of limitations contained in other sections of this chapter or Chap-
ter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation 
referred to in Subsection (a) in any respect. 
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History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 83; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3144; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-72; L. 1961, 
ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 
1981, ch. 287, § 5; 1988, ch. 116, § 8. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1988, designated the 
Additional compensation. 
Where stump of amputated leg failed to heal 
and stump was not sufficient to permit use of 
artificial leg, commission, in exercise of contin-
uing jurisdiction, could change award and 
grant employee additional compensation 
Spring Canyon Coal Co v Industrial Comm'n, 
60 Utah 553, 210 P 611 (1922) 
Where commission, more than thirty days 
after it had set aside previous award granting 
compensation, upon application of claimant as 
if no prior hearing were held, awarded compen-
sation and set aside its previous award setting 
aside award granting compensation, commis-
sion proceeded without jurisdiction notwith-
standing its continuing jurisdiction to modify 
award under this section, since it was not in-
tended by this section that commission might 
resume jurisdiction of case once regularly de-
previously undesignated two paragraphs as 
Subsections (1) and (2), added Subsection (3) 
and, m Subsection (1), divided the formerly un-
divided language into three sentences and re-
wrote the contents thereof 
termmed without some change or new develop-
ment in injury not known to parties when pre-
vious award was made Salt Lake City v In-
dustrial Comm'n, 61 Utah 514, 215 P 1047 
(1923) 
Under this section the commission may, in 
exercising its continuing jurisdiction, reopen 
case and award additional compensation for 
change of new development in injury or dis-
ability since award, but such additional com-
pensation may be made effective only from 
date of discovery of changed condition and can-
not be made retroactive to date of original 
award Aetna Life Ins Co v Industrial 
Comm'n, 69 Utah 102, 252 P 567 (1926) 
Where original award contemplated change 
in condition of employee for better, which 
change did not occur after employee received 
compensation for number of weeks awarded, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Additional compensation 
Application for rehearing 
Award for permanent, partial or total disability 
Award to alien dependents of deceased 
Basis of modification 
Changing award based on total dependency 
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Conditions precedent to modification 
Continuing medical expenses 
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Finality of adjudication 
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Interest on past-due benefits 
—Retroactive application 
Interest on settlements 
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Retention of jurisdiction 
Retroactive effect of order 
Review on appeal 
Scope and extent of continuing jurisdiction 
Supplemental award 
Theory of grant of further hearings 
Time of application 
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Douon, 646 R2d 707 (Utah 1982). 
Bfrg of Insurance report. 
fagurance carriers filing of final report of 
fart and statement of total losses following 
^payment made to injured worker is re-
ared by Industrial Commission and does not 
offer any jurisdiction of the settled matter 
%on the Industrial Commission; the injured 
Pieman's claim was barred by this section 
bare he had not attempted to invoke the 
nsdiction of the Industrial Commission for 
ore than three years after the last payment 
u made and the commission was correct in 
fusing to grant a hearing on the matter, 
person v. Industrial Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 446, 
LI R2d 721 (1973). 
otice. 
Where foreman saw accident, this section 
as inapplicable. Hartford Accident & Indem. 
o. v. Industrial Comm'n, 64 Utah 176, 228 P. 
>3 (1924). 
Where applicant lost his eye as a result of 
ircoma, being hit in the eye by a handball 
hile playing at the fire station and while on 
ity, and lieutenant, who was in charge of the 
re station at the time the injury occurred, was 
aying handball with applicant at time hand-
ball struck him in the eye, this was equivalent 
of notice of accident and injury to city. Salt Lake 
City v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 436, 140 
P.2d 644 (1943). 
Report of accident. 
The report made under the authority of this 
section may establish identity of employer at 
time of injury. Burke v. Industrial Comm'n, 75 
Utah 441, 286 P. 623 (1930) (decided under 
former § 35-1-97). 
These reports and supplemental reports are 
made on printed blanks which are furnished to 
employers. Utah Delaware Mining Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 76 Utah 187, 289 P. 94 (1930) 
(decided under former § 35-1-97). 
Report of employer to Industrial Commission 
stating that employee was injured on particular 
day was insufficient to establish time and man-
ner of accident, where shown by subsequent 
investigation to have given erroneous date. 
General Mills, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 
Utah 293, 105 P.2d 340 (1940) (decided under 
former § 35-1-97). 
Self-employed worker is not affected by re-
quirement that employee must notify employer 
of accident and injury within one year, since 
requirement is automatically fulfilled. State 
Ins. Fund v. Perkes, 672 P.2d 101 (Utah 1983). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa-
on § 454. 
5-1-98. Claims and benefits. 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disabil-
y cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if the employee does 
ot incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident, and 
iibmit those expenses to his employer or insurance carrier for payment, for a 
eriod of three consecutive years. 
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, tempo-
ary partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or 
ermanent total disability benefits is barred, unless an application for hearing 
\ filed with the commission within six years after the date of the accident. 
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for hearing is 
led within one year of the date of death of the employee. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-98, enacted by L. 
990, ch. 69, § 6. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
990, ch. 69, § 6 repeals former § 35-1-98, as 
last amended by Laws 1967, ch. 66, § 2, relat-
ing to control of physicians, and enacts the 
present section, effective April 23, 1990. 
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Form of report. 
The attending physician makes his report on 
a printed blank furnished for that purpose in 
History: C.L. 1917, § 3156x, added by L. 
1921, ch. 67,1; R.S. 1933,42-1-92; L. 1939, ch. 
51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-92; L. 1981, ch. 287, § 6; 
1986, ch. 211, § 11; 1988, ch. 116, § 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1986, in the first sen-
tence, substituted "accident and injury" for 
"same", substituted "in the notice subjects" for 
"therein shall subject" and made minor word 
changes; made stylistic changes in the second 
sentence; divided the former third sentence 
into three sentences and made stylistic 
changes therein; and, in the fourth sentence, 
deleted "industrial commission and" before 
"employee" and made minor word changes. 
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, 
designated the previously undesignated lan-
guage as Subsection (1), added Subsections (2) 
through (4) and, in Subsection (1), substituted 
which he describes the injury. Utah Delaware 
Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 187, 
289 P. 94 (1930). 
the present second and third sentences for the 
former last four sentences, relating to the same 
subject matter, and, in the first sentence, de-
leted the proviso clause at the end, relating to 
knowledge being equivalent to notice and to 
defect or inaccuracies in the notice, and, in the 
remaining language, substituted "If an em-
ployee claiming to have suffered an industrial 
accident in the service of his employer fails to 
give written notice within 180 calendar days to 
his employer or the commission" for "When an 
employee claiming to have suffered an injury 
in the service of his employer fails to give no-
tice to his employer" and "the employee's claim 
for benefits under this chapter is wholly 
barred" for "within 48 hours, when possible, or 
fails to report for medical treatment within 
that time, the compensation provided for here-
in shall be reduced 15%." 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 266. «=» 979. 
35-1-99. Notice of injury and claim for compensation — 
Limitations of action. 
(1) If an employee claiming to have suffered an industrial accident in the 
service of his employer fails to give written notice within 180 calendar days to 
his employer or the commission of the time and place where the accident and 
injury occurred, and of the nature of the accident and injury, the employee's 
claim for benefits under this chapter is wholly barred. If, for any reason, an 
employee is himself unable to provide this written notice, the employee's next-
of-kin or attorney may file it within the required 180-day period. Receipt of 
written notice is presumed if the employer complies with the terms of Section 
35-1-97 by filing with the commission an accident report, or if the employer or 
its insurance carrier pays disability or medical benefits to or on behalf of the 
injured employee. 
(2) In nonpermanent total disability cases, an employee's medical benefit 
entitlement, except with respect to prosthetic devices, ceases if the employee 
does not incur, and submit to his employer or insurance carrier for payment, 
for a period of three consecutive years, medical expenses reasonably related to 
the industrial accident. 
(3) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, tempo-
rary partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or per-
manent total disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an application for 
hearing is filed with the industrial commission within six years after the date 
of the accident. 
(4) A claim for death benefits is wholly barred, unless an application for 
hearing is filed within one year of the date of death of the employee. 
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F. The Commission shall suggest a format for use by parties desirous of settling claims 
of doubtful compensability. 
R568-1-17. Permanent Total Disability. 
A. The Commission is required under Section 35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a finding of 
total disability as measured by the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the 
Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, amended April 
1, 1993. The use of the term "substance of the sequential decision-making process" is deemed 
to confer some latitude on the Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in making its 
findings relative to permanent total disability. The Commission does not interpret the code 
section to eliminate the requirement that a finding by the Commission in permanent and total 
disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until rehabilitation training and/or evaluation 
has been accomplished. 
B. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its designee has made, or is 
in the process of making, a determination of disability under the foregoing process, the 
Commission may use this information in lieu of instituting the process on its own behalf. 
C. In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker has qualified for Social 
Security disability benefits, the Commission will determine if a significant cause of the disability 
is the claimant's industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or causes. 
D. To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability the Commission incorporates 
the rules of disability determination in 20 CFR 404.1520, amended April 1, 1993. The 
sequential decision making process referred to requires a series of questions and evaluations to 
be made in sequence. In short, these are: 
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity? 
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment? 
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the duration requirement in 20 CFR 
404.1509, amended April 1, 1993, and the listed impairments in 20 CFR Subpart P Appendix 
1, amended April 1, 1993? 
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work? 
5. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing any other work? 
E. After a tentative finding of permanent total disability, the applicant shall be referred 
to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for evaluation and rehabilitation work-up. If the Utah 
State Office of Rehabilitation determines that the applicant is unable to do any other work 
because of his age, education, and previous work experience, and as a result of an industrial 
accident, there shall be a hearing to review the determination of the Utah State Office of 
Rehabilitation and any objections thereto, unless the parties waive the right to a hearing. 
F. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the parties, the Commission shall issue 
an order finding or denying permanent total disability based upon the preponderance of the 
evidence and with due consideration of the vocational factors in combination with the residual 
functional capacity which the commission incorporates as published in 20 CFR 404 Subpart P 
Appendix 2, amended April 1, 1993. 
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